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I. Introduction
      
 
Recent years have seen a worldwide surge in interest in intellectual property rights, 
particularly patents, in academia, in policy circles, and in the business community.  This 
heightened level of interest has produced a substantial body of research in economics ranging 
from analyses of decisions to use patents rather than alternative means of protecting intellectual 
property (Cohen, et al, 1999) to studies of the ways in which patents are used and enforced once 
granted (see, for example, Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Launjouw and Lerner, 1997).  There has, 
however, been little systematic attention paid to the process of how patent rights are created. 
Indeed, only recently have researchers begun to develop a systematic understanding of the 
differences in intellectual property regimes across countries and over time (Lerner, 2000).  
Moreover, except for some preliminary aggregate statistics (Griliches, 1984; 1990), there are no 
published studies of the empirical determinants of patent examiner productivity, or of linkages 
between characteristics of patent examiners and the subsequent performance of the patent rights 
that they issue.
1  Here, we begin to address these questions by evaluating the role that variation in 
examination procedures and in the exercise of discretion by individual patent examiners may 
play in determining the allocation of patent rights, and their subsequent testing by the courts. 
Filling in this gap in our knowledge may yield a number of benefits.  First, and perhaps 
most importantly, it is difficult to assess the likely impact of changes in the funding or operation 
of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) without some understanding of the 
“USPTO production function.”  For example, at various points in the past there have been shifts 
in the resources available to the USPTO as well as in the incentives and objectives provided to 
examiners, recently focused on reducing the time taken between initial filing of a patent 
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Griliches (1990), Cohen et al (2000) and Hall et al (2001) for an introduction.  2
application and final issuance.  At the same time, court rulings and revisions in USPTO practice 
have broadened intellectual property protection into new areas, such as genomics and business 
methods, where the novelty and obviousness of inventions and the scope of claims awarded may 
be difficult, at least initially, to assess.  Developments such as these raise a variety of difficult 
questions for policymakers.  How might changes in the incentives for timeliness and patent 
breadth impact the overall quality of the patent system?  Is there a historical tradeoff between 
quality and quantity?  To what extent does quality reflect systematic differences across 
examiners, above and beyond the effects of training, experience or tenure? 
Our analysis includes both a qualitative and quantitative component.  In the first part of 
the paper, we review our qualitative investigation, in which we develop an informal 
understanding of the process of patent examination and investigate potential areas for differences 
among patent examiners to impact policy-relevant measures of the performance of the patent 
system.  The key insight from our qualitative analysis is that “there may be as many patent 
offices as patent examiners.”  There is reason to suspect substantial heterogeneity among 
examiners, and to suspect that this heterogeneity affects the outcome of the examination process. 
This insight motivates the development of the key hypotheses in Section III. 
To test these hypotheses, we construct a novel dataset that links information from USPTO 
“front page” information with data based on the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) record between 1997 and 2000.  We consider a sample of 182 patents on which the 
CAFC issued a ruling on validity during this period.  For each patent, we identify the primary and 
secondary examiners associated with the patent, and collect the complete set of issued patents 
issued by that examiner during their tenure at the USPTO.  We then construct measures based on 
this examiner-specific patent collection, including their experience with examination, workload, 
and measures based on the citation patterns associated with issued patents.. 
We present our key findings in several steps.  First, we show that patent examiners differ 
on a number of observable characteristics, including their overall experience at the USPTO (both 
in terms of years as well at total number of issued patents), their degree of technological 
specialization, their propensity to cite their own patents, and their propensity to issue patents that 
are highly cited.  Indeed, a significant portion of the overall variance among patents in measures  3
such as the number and pattern of citations received, the number and pattern of citations made, 
and the approval time can be explained by the identity of the examiner — in the language of 
econometrics, “examiner fixed effects.”  These examiner effects are significant even after 
controlling for the patent’s technology field and its cohort (i.e., the year the patent was issued).  
We then turn to an examination of whether observable characteristics of our sample of patents 
tested by the CAFC such as their citation rate or approval time can be tied to observable 
examiner characteristics such as their experience or the rate at which “their” patents receive 
citations.  Here we find strong evidence for the impact of examiners.  For example, there is a 
significant positive relationship between the citations received by a subsequently litigated patent 
and the “propensity” of its examiner to issue patents that attract a large numbers of citations.  
This result leads to the core of the analysis — tying these relationships to patent validity rulings. 
The results of our econometric analysis are striking.   Although the outcome of a test of validity 
by the CAFC is unrelated to the number of citations received by that particular patent, validity is 
strongly related to the portion of the citation rate explained by the examiner’s idiosyncratic 
propensity to issue patents which receive a high level of citations.    To the extent that the 
examiner-specific citation rate reflects the “generosity” of examiners in allowing claims, our 
empirical findings suggest that one of the roles of the CAFC is to review the discretion exercised 
in the patent examination process.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we review our 
qualitative data gathering, and motivate the evidence for our key testable hypotheses, which we 
state in Section III.  Section IV describes the novel dataset we have constructed, and Section V 
reviews the results.  A final section offers a discussion of our findings as well as identifying areas 
for future empirical research in this area. 
 
II.  The Patent Examination Process 
 
Methodology 
This section reviews the initial stage of our research, a qualitative investigative phase 
where we sought to understand the process of patent examination and the potential role of patent 
examiner characteristics on that process.  This type of investigation is precisely what has been  4
lacking from much academic and policy discussion of the impact of patent office practices, 
procedures, and personnel on the performance of the intellectual property rights system.  While 
practitioners and USPTO personnel are intimately acquainted with these procedures, there has 
been little attempt to identify which aspects of the examination process can be linked through 
rigorous empirical analysis to the key policy challenges facing USPTO. 
Our qualitative research involved three distinct stages.  First, we informally interviewed a 
small number of former patent examiners and patent attorneys, outside the USPTO, in order to 
develop a basic grounding in the process and procedures of the USPTO.  This allowed us to 
evaluate and understand some of our initial hypotheses about the impact of patent examiner 
characteristics and USPTO practice on the ultimate allocation of intellectual property rights.  We 
used this working knowledge to develop a proposal to undertake systematic interviews within the 
USPTO; and with the assistance of the NAS STEP Board, we engaged in several meetings with 
senior USPTO managers to evaluate the possibility of administering a survey which would allow 
us to link detailed information about examiner history (e.g., educational and employment 
background) with information that could be gleaned from patent statistics about differences 
among patent examiners (e.g., differences in approval times or citation statistics).  This approach 
was not entirely successful as we were unable to obtain approval to distribute a systematic survey 
of our own design to a broad cross-section of current and former examiners.  However, USPTO 
management did generously allow us to undertake several visits in which we were allowed to 
conduct informal interviews and question-and-answer sessions with a small number of 
examiners, mostly limited to those in a supervisory role.  These conversations were very helpful 
in developing a number of more subtle, precise, and econometrically testable hypotheses about 
how the practice and procedures of the USPTO might impact the allocation of intellectual 
property rights.  This leads to the third stage of qualitative research, where we confirmed the 
viability of our hypotheses with individuals external to the USPTO.  Overall, our qualitative 
research phase included interviews with approximately 20 current or former patent examiners as 
well as an equal number of patent attorneys with considerable experience in patent prosecution. 
 
The Examination Process  5
Here we describe the patent examination process in general terms, focusing on the aspects 
where we identified potential sources of heterogeneity in examination practice.  The USPTO is 
one of the earliest and among the most visible agencies of the Federal government, receiving 
more certified mail per day than any other single organization in the world.  Located in a single 
campus of connected buildings, the USPTO is staffed by over 3000 patent examiners, and has 
more than 6,000 total full-time equivalent employees.  In recent years the examiner corps has 
been responsible for over 160,000 patent approvals per year.  The Federal government raises 
nearly $1 billion in revenue per year from the fees and other revenue streams associated with the 
USPTO. 
The workflow and procedures associated with patent approval are quite systematic and 
well-determined.
2  After being received at a central receiving office, and passing basic checks to 
qualify for a filing date, patent applications are sorted by a specialized classification branch
3 
which allocates them to one of approximately 235 “Art Units” — a group of examiners who 
examine closely related technology, and constitute an administrative unit.  Within the Art Unit, a 
“Supervisory Patent Examiner” (a senior examiner with administrative responsibilities) looks at 
the technology claimed in the application and assigns it to a specific examiner.  Once the patent 
is allocated to a given examiner, that examiner will, in most cases, have continuing responsibility 
for examination of the case until it is disposed of – either through rejection, allowance, or 
discontinuation.  The examination process therefore typically involves an interaction between a 
single examiner and the attorneys of the inventor or assignee.  While the stages associated with 
this process are relatively structured (and exhaustively documented in the Manual of Patent 
Examining and Procedure) they leave substantial discretion to the examiner in how to deal with a 
particular application. 
The examination of an application begins with a review of legal formalities and 
requirements, and an analysis of claims to determine what the claimed invention actually is.  The 
examiner also reads the description of the invention (part of the “specification”) to ensure that 
                                                 
2 In this short discussion, we do not cover the legal requirements for patentability, since these are covered in great 
detail elsewhere.  Indeed, the departure point between our analysis and more of the prior literature in this area is that 
we are principally concerned with the actual process of examination rather than the standards as defined by the 
patent law. 
3 This sorting function identifies and appropriately treats applications with national security implications.  6
disclosure requirements are met.  The next step is a search of prior art to determine whether the 
claimed invention is anticipated by prior patents or non-patent references, and whether the 
claimed invention is obvious in view of the prior art.  There is considerable scope for 
heterogeneity in this search procedure.  The prior art search typically begins with a review of 
existing US patents in relevant technology classes and subclasses, either through computerized 
tools, or by hand examination of hard-copy stacks of issued patents, and may then proceed to a 
word search of foreign patent documents, scientific and technical journals, or other databases and 
indexes.  USPTO’s Scientific and Technical Information Center maintains extensive collections 
of reference materials.  Word searches typically require significant skill and time to conduct 
effectively.  The applicant may also include significant amounts of materials documenting prior 
art with their application.  The extent to which examiners review this non-patent material may be 
a function of the nature of the technology, maturity of the field, and the ease with which it can be 
searched.  For example, in science-intensive fields like biotechnology where much of the relevant 
prior art is in the form of research articles published in the scientific literature, and indexed by 
services such as Medline, examiners may rely extensively on non-patent materials.  In very young 
technologies, or in areas where the USPTO has just begun to grant patents, there may be very 
limited patent prior art.  In more mature technologies examiners may have only a moderate 
interest in non-patent materials, and limited ability to easily or effectively search them. 
Once relevant prior art has been identified, the examiner obtains and reads relevant 
documents.  Again, different examiners and different Art Units may use substantially different 
examination technologies.  For example, while many of the mechanical Art Units have 
historically relied on the “shoes” (the storage bins for hard-copy patent documents), and may 
search for prior art primarily by viewing drawings, a typical search in the life sciences can 
involve detailed algorithmic searches by computer to evaluate long genetic sequences, and 
review of tens or hundreds of research articles and other references.  Some examiners may 
develop and keep close to hand their own specialized collections of prior art to facilitate 
searching.  Indeed, patent examiners identify and frequently refer to “favorite” examples of prior 
art that usefully describe (“teach”) the technology area and the bounds of prior art in a way which  7
facilitates the examination of a wide range of subsequent applications.
4 
After reviewing the specification to ensure that it provides an adequate “enabling 
disclosure” and an appropriate wording of claims, the initial examination is complete. The 
examiner then arrives at a determination of whether or not the claimed invention is patentable, 
and composes a “first action” letter to the applicant (or, normally, their attorney) that accepts 
(“allows”), or rejects, the claims.  Some applications may be allowed in their entirety upon first 
examination.  More commonly, some or all of the claims are rejected as being anticipated by the 
prior art, obvious, not adequately enabled, or lacking in utility, and the examiner will write a 
detailed analysis of the basis for rejection.  The applicant then has a fixed length of time to 
respond by amending the claims and/or supplying additional evidence or argument.  After 
receiving and evaluating this response, the examiner can then “allow” the application if it is 
satisfactory (the most common stage in the process at which an application proceeds on to final 
issuance of a patent), negotiate minor changes with the attorney, or write a “second action” letter, 
which maintains some or all of the initial rejections.  In this letter the examiner is encouraged to 
point out what might be done to overcome these rejections.  Though at this stage the applicant’s 
ability to further amend the application is formally somewhat restricted, in effect additional 
rounds of negotiation between the examiner and applicant may ensue.  The applicant also has the 
opportunity to appeal decisions for re-examination or evaluation within an internal USPTO 
administrative proceeding.  However, such actions are quite rare; most applications are allowed 
(or not) on the second or third action letter. 
USPTO operates various internal systems to ensure “quality control” through auditing, 
reviewing, and checking examiner’s work.  This includes the collection and analysis of detailed 
statistics about various measures of examiner work product flow.  For example, Supervisory 
Patent Examiners, as well as their supervisors, routinely evaluate data relating to the distribution 
of times to action and the number of actions required prior to “disposal” of an application 
through allowance, abandonment, or appeal.  These measurements are one of the many tools that 
USPTO uses to refine the internal management of the examination process. 
                                                 
4 Many of these “favorites” are university or public sector patents, which may be written less strategically than those 
for private firms.  In part, this may yield an alternative hypothesis to the finding that university patents are more 
highly cited than control patents by private firms (Jaffe, Henderson, and Trajtenberg, 1998).  8
It is also useful to note that examiners are allocated fixed amounts of time for completing 
the initial examination of the application, and for disposal of the application.  However, 
examiners are free to average these time allotments over their caseload.  Moreover, there are 
differences in these time allocations across technology groups, and there also have been changes 
over time.  Though we do not explore this variation in the current study, exploiting these changes 
in USPTO practice across technology groups and over time could give some leverage for 
understanding the relationship between time constraints and patent quality. 
 
Examiner Training and Specialization 
Variation among examiners in their conduct of the examination process may arise from 
several sources, but two in particular are worth pointing out.   First, at a given point in time, or 
for a particular patent cohort, examiners necessarily vary substantially in their experience.  
Experience may affect the quality of patent examination, and this has been a source of concern in 
recent years as the rate of hiring into the USPTO has increased, particularly into art areas with 
little in-house expertise.  On the other hand, our qualitative research greatly emphasized the role 
of the systematic apprenticeship process within the USPTO, which is likely to reduce errors 
made by junior examiners.  For the first several years of their career, examiners are denoted as 
Secondary Examiners, and their work is routinely reviewed by a more senior Primary Examiner. 
Over time, the Secondary Examiner takes greater control over their case load, and the Primary 
Examiner focuses on teaching more subtle lessons about the practice of dealing with applicants 
and their attorneys, and instilling the delicate “not too much, not too little” balance that the 
USPTO is trying to achieve in the patent examination process. 
Second, as alluded to above, Art Units may vary substantially in their organization and 
functioning.  In the most traditional group structure, the allocation of work promotes a maximal 
amount of specialization by individual examiners. For example, in many of the mechanical Art 
Units, an individual examiner may be responsible for nearly all of the applications within specific 
patent classes or subclasses.  In other Art Units, however, the approach is more team-oriented.  In 
these groups, there is less technological specialization (multiple subclasses are shared by multiple 
examiners) and there is likely a higher degree of discussion and knowledge sharing among 
examiners.  In the more specialized organization, there are far fewer checks and balances on the  9
practices of a given examiner.  When the examiner has all of the relevant technological 
information; the cost for an auditor to effectively review their work becomes very high.  By 
contrast, in less specialized environments, there are likely greater opportunities for monitoring, 




Our qualitative investigation of the patent examination process both generated a number 
of insights central to our hypothesis development and raised some flags about potential hazards 
for empirical research in this area. 
The first key finding from the qualitative evaluation of patent examination can be 
summarized in the phrase of one of our informants:  “there may be as many patent offices as 
there are patent examiners.”  In other words, though the examination process is relatively 
structured, and USPTO devotes considerable resources to quality control, substantial discretion is 
provided to examiners in how they deal with applications, and the extent to which they exercise 
this discretion can potentially vary substantially across examiners.  Several features contribute to 
this potential for heterogeneity, including the formal emphasis on specialization, variation among 
Art Units and individual examiners in their approach to searching prior art, the fact that much 
learning is through an apprenticeship system with only a small number of mentors, and the 
existence of differences across groups and examiners in the time allocated to specific tasks and 
examination procedures. 
This heterogeneity might manifest itself in several ways. First, there may be substantial 
variation across examiners in the breadth of patent grants — some examiners may have a 
propensity to systematically allow a more restrictive or more expansive set of claims.  One 
potential consequence of this use of discretion may be that patents issued by examiners who tend 
to allow broader claims will impinge on a greater number of follow-on inventions, and so 
therefore receive more citations over time.  Though prior research has emphasized the degree to 
which the number of citations received by a patent as an indicator of its underlying inventive 
significance, it is important to recognize that a given patent’s propensity to receive future 
citations may also be related to the generosity of the examiner in allowing a broad patent, relative  10
to an “average” examiner’s practice. 
Second, examiners may vary substantially in their propensity for self-citation.  Self-
citation is the practice by which examiners tend to include citations to patents for which they 
were the examiner.  A high degree of self-citation is particularly likely for examiners working in 
technology areas which are highly specialized, with little communication across examiners, and 
which are highly reliant on hard-copy technologies for the prior art search process.   
Third, examiners may vary substantially in their effective average “approval time,” the 
length of time between initial application and the date at which the patent issues.  Though a large 
fraction of the lag between application and approval will, of course, be driven by external forces 
— the speed at which applicants respond to office actions, for example — differences across Art 
Units and across examiners in their workload and the type of applications they receive will likely 
lead to differences in average approval time.  It is an interesting question whether this involves a 
tradeoff with other dimensions of quality, specifically the ability to withstand judicial scrutiny. 
At the same time that this qualitative analysis formed the basis for our hypotheses 
concerning how examiners might influence the allocation of patent rights, it also suggested 
several limitations to any empirical work, and some challenges that must be overcome before 
drawing policy conclusions from it.  First, and perhaps most importantly, it is important to take 
account of variation across technologies and patent cohorts in any empirical analysis.  Our 
investigation suggests that there are large differences across Art Units in examination practice, 
and these technology effects must be controlled for.  In addition, examination practice, resources, 
and management processes have changed over time, so it is also necessary to control in a detailed 
way for the cohort in which a particular patent was granted. 
Second, as we proceed to test hypotheses about observable measures of the examination 
process, such as citations, we should be careful to recognize how noisy the underlying data 
generation process is likely to be.  Much of the variation in any observable patent characteristic is 
likely to reflect the nature of the invention, the behavior of the applicant, and other unobserved 
factors.  It is important that we develop a test that will be able to discern rather subtle 
relationships in the data — the impact of examiner effects is likely to be in light of the overall 
noisiness of the data generating process.  Finally, our hypothesis development must recognize  11
and incorporate the fact that the USPTO has multiple objectives and that there is no single “silver 
bullet” measure of performance, particularly among easily available statistics.  While, all else 
equal, shorter approval times are socially beneficial (particularly in the era when disclosure did 
not occur until the patent was issued), speed is not a virtue in and of itself if achieving shorter 
approval times involves trade-offs with other important objectives.  With these caveats in mind, 
we now turn to a fuller development of key testable hypotheses associated with examiner 
characteristics. 
 
III. Hypothesis  Development 
 
Our empirical analysis is organized around two sets of hypotheses, those reflecting the 
relationship between patent characteristics and examiner characteristics, and those reflecting the 
relationship of patent litigation outcomes to patent and/or examiner characteristics. 
 
The Impact of Examiners on Patent Characteristics 
One of the key insights from our qualitative data gathering is the potential for 
heterogeneity across examiners in their prosecution of patent applications.  Perhaps the single 
most important potential consequence of examiner heterogeneity would be systematic differences 
across examiners in the average scope of the claims in patents issued under their review.  
Inventors who receive patent rights with substantial scope will, on average, have been allowed 
more valuable rights.  Identifying the impact of this variation in examiner “generosity” is subtle.  
The key comes from recognizing that patents with broader claims more likely constrain the 
claims granted to future inventors.  As a result, beyond their innate inventive importance, patents 
with broader allowed claims will tend to be more highly cited. Conversely, if examiners use 
discretion similarly, and examiners receive applications with a similar distribution of inventive 
importance, then the average level of citation should not vary by patent examiner. 
While a “generous” grant is a boon to the inventor associated with the application, such 
treatment may reduce incentives for future inventors, as the hurdle associated with achieving a 
significant inventive step increases in the breadth and scope offered to inventors from the past.  
From the perspective of these follow-on inventors, one mechanism to earn a higher return on  12
their own inventions is to seek to invalidate the broad scope associated with a given patent, 
resulting in specific instances of litigation among the population of an examiner’s patents. 
Of course, a number of additional factors determine the number of citations received by a 
patent or even the average level of citations received by patents associated with a patent 
examiner, including the particular type of technology and the amount of time that has passed 
since the application.  However, after controlling for technology and cohort effects, variation in 





H1:  Patent examiners will vary in terms of the average level of citations received by the 
patents they examine.  This variation will exceed what can be attributed to the 
technological area of the patents they examine. 
 
In addition to this variation among examiners in their level of “generosity,” there is likely 
variation among examiners in their ability to use search technologies that identify the broadest 
range of possible prior art.  As well, differences in the organization of different Art Units will 
likely result in different levels of communication and monitoring among examiners, and among 
examiners and their supervisors.  As discussed earlier, one of the consequences of this 
heterogeneity among examiners is that some examiners may tend towards a more autarkic 
approach to examination, principally relying on their past experience examining in a particular 
technological field, while others will draw on a wider range of resources.  This discussion 
motivates our second set of hypotheses: 
 
H2:  Examiners will vary in their level of self-citation, and not simply due to the technological 
area of the patents they examine.  Self-citation should be decreasing in the adoption of 
more advanced prior art search procedures and increasing in the technological 
specialization of the examiner. 
 
Finally, examiners will vary in the workload they are given, and in the allocations of time 
                                                 
5 It is possible that variation in citations received by an examiner reflects selectivity in the assignment of applications 
to examiners (e.g., SPEs tend to allocate particularly important inventions to particularly able examiners).  We  13
for particular tasks associated with the examination process.   As several examiners related to us, 
however, this variation may be in place in order to allow examiners to more effectively achieve 
other objectives of the examination process, such as precision or effective communication with 
the patent bar community in their technological specialty.  Thus, we offer a third hypothesis 
about the role of the approval time: 
 
H3:  Examiners will vary in their average approval time, above and beyond what can be 
attributed to the technology of the patents examined.  This variation will be negatively 
correlated with other dimensions of performance. 
 
The Impact of Examiners on Patent Litigation Outcomes 
Ultimately, we are interested in tying examiner characteristics to more objective measures 
of the performance of the examination process.  We organize this portion of the analysis around 
patent litigation outcomes.  Specifically, we are interested in the possibility that the type of 
heterogeneity implicit in H1, H2, and H3 (as well as other examiner characteristics) will manifest 
itself in imperfections in the scope of patent rights that are allowed by examiners.  As a 
preliminary foray into this area, we focus on findings of invalidity by the Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit.
6  By focusing on invalidity, we develop hypotheses relating to the role that 
heterogeneity among examiners might play in leading to the excess allocation of patent rights; 
however, in future work, we hope to explore the converse possibility that this same heterogeneity 
may also occasionally manifest itself as under-provision. 
Perhaps the most obvious potential source of variation among examiners is their overall 
level of examination experience.  In recent years, various commentators have hypothesized that 
the rapid growth in patent applications and the concomitant rise in the number of examiners has 
reduced the experience of the average examiner, particularly in technology areas such as business 
methods, which have only recently begun to receive patent rights.  Implicit in this argument is the 
proposition that less experienced examiners are more likely to inappropriately allow patent rights 
that should not be granted.  While it is likely true that experience is helpful in the examination 
                                                                                                                                                             
discuss this hypothesis further when considering the impact of average citations received  on litigation outcomes. 
6 We discuss how this particular sampling choice may impact our results in Section IV, where we present the data 
and our sampling scheme in more detail.  14
process, the procedures of the USPTO explicitly recognize the value of experience through 
practices such as the division of responsibilities between primary and secondary examiners, and 
the strong culture of internal promotion.  There may therefore be competing effects that mitigate 
the impact of experience on litigation outcomes.  However, in order to be precise about the 
specific theory that has been put forth, we offer a testable hypothesis about the impact of 
examiner experience. 
 
H4:  The probability of a litigated patent being ruled valid will be increasing in the experience 
of the examiner. 
 
In addition, H1, H2, and H3 offer at least three potential sources of heterogeneity which 
may be associated with excess allocation of patent rights, and therefore with invalidity findings.  
First, H1 states that some examiners are more “generous” than others, and that this should be 
associated with a higher level of citations received by their patents.  To the extent that the claims 
allowed by over-generous examiners will tend to be more likely to be found invalid by the 
CAFC, the probability of validity should be declining in examiners’ average level of citations 
received.  Similarly, to the extent that it may be easier to overturn the validity of patents based on 
less thorough searchers of the prior art, the probability of a ruling of validity may be declining in 
the self-citation of the examiner.  Finally, if there is a tradeoff between the speed of approval and 
the quality of the examination, then the probability of validity will likely be declining in the 
approval time of the examiner.  This discussion motivates the following hypotheses: 
 
H5:  The probability of a litigated patent being ruled valid will be declining in the examiner’s 
average citations received per patent, and in the self-citation rate of the examiner, but 
should be increasing in the examiner’s average approval time. 
 
Of course, as suggested by our earlier discussion, a test of H5 requires the ability to 
control for the technological specialization of the examiner, as well as controls for the cohort of 
the litigated patent.  Our empirical analysis includes detailed controls for each of these effects.  
As well, to the extent that the assignment of patent applications to examiners is subject to 
selectivity  (i.e., particularly important technologies, associated with higher citation rates, are  15
assigned to more able examiners), our ability to find evidence for the impact of generosity 
become more difficult.  Since selectivity holds the opposite prediction about the impact of 
examiner average citations on validity findings, the simple test suggested by H5 results in a lower 
bound on the role of generosity in judicial review. 
Finally, the richness of patent data allows us to explore the impact of examiner 
heterogeneity more precisely.  When determining validity, the CAFC will, of course, only 
consider the merits of the patent under review rather than the historical record of a particular 
examiner.  To determine the impact of examiner characteristics on the probability of validity, 
only that portion of the citations received by the patent that are due to the examiner’s generosity 
is relevant.  If H1 is true, i.e. the number of citations received by the litigated patent is a function 
of the examiner’s average number of citations per patent, then this relationship allows us to 
estimate this portion econometrically.
7  This motivates the following hypothesis: 
 
H6:  The probability of validity should be declining in the predicted number of citations 
received by a patent, where the prediction is based on the examiner’s generosity. 
 
Together, these hypotheses provide several potential observable consequences of 
examiner heterogeneity, with clear implications for patent policy. Consider, for example, the 
perennial policy issue of patent “disposal” times.  By linking approval to other outcomes (such as 
validity rulings) these hypotheses offer potential insight into the potential for tradeoffs associated 
with speeding of the examination process.  To empirically test these propositions, we must tie 
these hypotheses to a specific set of data, to the description of which we now turn. 
 
IV. The  Data 
 
The Sample 
Data for this study were derived from the USPTO’s public access patent databases, and 
                                                 
7 Specifically, H6 can be tested using an “instrumental variables” estimator where the validity ruling is regressed on 
the predicted level of citations associated with the litigated patent, with the excluded exogenous variable in the 
validity equation is the examiner’s generosity, as measured by the average level of citations received.  Intuitively, 
this procedure is equivalent to a two stage estimation procedure.  In the first stage, total citations received by each 
patent is regressed on the examiner’s average citations per patent, and other controls.  Predicted values of the total 
citations variable, i.e. the portion of citations attributable to the examiner’s generosity, are then used in the second  16
from the Lexis-Nexis database of decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
We began by searching for CAFC decisions in cases where the validity of a patent was 
contested.  In the years 1997-2000, there were 216 such cases, of which 34 were excluded from 
further consideration because they involved plant patents, re-examined patents, or other 
complicating factors were present.  For each of the remaining 182 “CAFC-tested” patents, we 
determined whether or not the CAFC found the patent to be valid or invalid, and on what 
grounds: novelty, subject matter, obviousness, procedural errors etc.  Note that in many instances 
the CAFC found the patent invalid for more than one reason.  In just over 50% of these 182 
cases, the patent was found to be invalid.  Of these, the CAFC found problems with novelty 
(Section 101) in 37% of cases, with obviousness (Section 102) in 47% of cases, and with the 
specification of the patent (Section 112) in 15% of cases. 
Having obtained this list of CAFC-tested patents, we then used it to construct a sample of 
“CAFC-tested” examiners.
8  To do so we identify the 196 individuals listed as either the primary 
or secondary examiner for each of the 182 CAFC-tested patents.
9 
For each CAFC-tested examiner, we search for all patents granted in the period 1976-
2000 on which the individual was listed as a primary or secondary examiner.   This search was 
conducted using a fairly generous “wild card” procedure to allow for typographical errors in the 
source data and variations in the spelling or formatting of names.  Results were then carefully 
screened by hand to ensure that individuals were correctly identified.  For example, our 
procedure would recognize “Merrill, Stephen A.”, “Merril, Stephen”, “Merrill, S.A.” and 
“Merrill, Steve” as being the same person, but would exclude “Meril, S.” or “Merrill, Stavros A.” 
If anything, this process erred on the side of caution, so that we may be slightly under-counting 
examiners’ output.  The initial search returned just over 316,000 candidate patents, from which 
we excluded about 6% miss-identified patents to arrive a base dataset of 298,441 patents 
attributable to the 196 CAFC-tested examiners.
10 
                                                                                                                                                             
stage validity regression. 
8 In using the phrase “CAFC-tested” we do not mean to imply that a ruling of invalidity by the CAFC necessarily 
implies any shortcoming on the part of the examiner. 
9 In future work it would be possible to conduct parts of our analysis of patent examiners on a much wider sample of 
individuals who performed this function at the USPTO.  A useful feature of our small sample, however, is that each 
examiner in the sample has examined at least one patent that was “tested” for validity by the CAFC. 
10 Since we have not been able to obtain a definitive matching of examiner ID numbers with issued patents, and have  17
Using the dataset of 298,441 patents we constructed complete histories of each CAFC-
tested examiner’s patent output during the sample period, as well as various measures of their 
productivity, experience with examination, workload, and examining practice.  Each of these 
patents was matched to the NBER Patent Citation Data File (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001) 
to obtain data on each patent's technology classes, citations made, and citations received, as well 
as variables computed from these data which measure the breadth of citations.
11 
In our empirical analysis that follows, we focus on the primary examiner for each of the 182 
CAFC-tested patents.  Since the same primary examiner may show up several times in the 
sample, we actually have 136 CAFC-tested primary examiners. In computing statistics across 
examiners, we weight examiner characteristics of by the number of times that each examiner 
shows up in our data.  Table 1 gives variable definitions, and Table 2A presents descriptive 
statistics for our linked datasets on CAFC-tested patents, CAFC-tested primary examiners, and 
patent histories of these examiners.   
The set of 182 CAFC-tested patents is a highly selective sample; these patents are  not at 
all representative of the population of all granted patents.  Table 2B compares mean values of 
some key variables for the 182 CAFC-tested patents with those typical of a utility patent applied 
for in the decade of the 1980s.
12  On average, the CAFC-tested patents contain more claims, 
make more citations, receive more citations, and take longer to issue. This is not surprising, since 
litigants who pursue CAFC review likely perceive a high value for intellectual property over a 
given technology.  As well, given that the litigants have not settled, these patents are likely 
associated with a higher level of ambiguity than an average patent (perhaps an additional reason 
for the longer time to approval). 
Though the CAFC-tested patents are quite selective, there is little reason to believe that 
CAFC-tested primary examiners are very different from the population of all examiners in a way 
                                                                                                                                                             
had to work from published data sources this search misses a small number of patents.  We are confident, however, 
that missing observations are missing at random, and therefore do not bias our results. 
11 Jaffe, Henderson and Trajtenberg (1998) computed two measures of the breath of citations across technology 
classes: “Originality” which captures the extent to which citations made by a patent are spread across technology 
classes, and “Generality”  which  captures the extent to which citations received by a patent are spread across 
technology classes.  See Table 1 for definitions. 
12 The statistics for a typical patent are based on the tables and figures in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001).  18
which undermines our empirical strategy.
13  On the one hand, due to the way we have 
constructed our sample, the probability of an examiner being in our dataset is likely proportional 
to the examiner’s experience (measured in terms of total patents examined) at the USPTO.  Thus 
relative to the set of examiners working at the USPTO on any given day, we are under-sampling 
inexperienced examiners.  As well, our sample may under-represent the degree of variation in the 
degree of generosity; patents associated with the least generous examiners are less likely to be 
subject to an appellate validity claim.  As such, our empirical design is providing a lower bound 
of the impact of examiner experience or generosity on patent litigation outcomes.  Because 
examiner patent histories begin in our dataset in 1976, the measures of experience are slightly 
downward biased.  About 30% of the examiners in our sample first appear in the dataset in 1976, 
some fraction of which must be assumed to have begun their careers somewhat earlier.  
Similarly, citations to patents granted before 1976 cannot be evaluated as self-citations (or not) 
since we do not have information on who the examiner was, and information based on citations 




We present our results in several steps. First, we review evidence of the existence of 
heterogeneity among examiners, and show that an important component of the overall variation 
in commonly used patent statistics can be explained by examiner “fixed effects.”  Having 
established the existence of observable examiner heterogeneity, we then examine the sensitivity 
of various characteristics of CAFC-tested patents to observable examiner characteristics.  We 
then turn to a discussion of the determinants of patent validity.  Consistent with our discussion in 
Section III, we evaluate a reduced-form model of the sensitivity of validity to examiner 
characteristics as well as a more nuanced instrumental variables estimation which only allows 
examiner characteristics to impact validity through their impact on characteristics unique to the 
CAFC-tested patent. 
 
                                                 
13 We intend to test this proposition more carefully by randomly sampling examiners.  Initial comparisons with the 
small set of examiners caught in the wildcard search, but rejected as poor matches, find no substantive differences 
between them and the sample of CAFC-tested primary examiners in terms of experience and other characteristics.  19
The Nature of Examiner Heterogeneity 
Our analysis begins with a set of figures that display the heterogeneity among examiners 
along four distinct dimensions:  experience, the level of citations received per patent, the degree 
of self-citation, and the degree of technological specialization in the patents examined.  Figure 1 
plots EXPERIENCE (# of patents) across examiners.  We see that while the average examiner in 
our sample has a lifetime experience of over 2000 patents, a large number are associated with 
over 4000 patents, with a few outliers over 7000.  This distribution is consistent with the 
substantial variation we see in the examiners’ length of tenure at the USPTO.  For example, 
nearly a third of the CAFC-tested examiners have over 24 years experience at the USPTO.
14 
We next turn to an evaluation of the extent to which examiners specialize in particular 
technology classes over the course of their career.  One simple way to measure this specialization 
is to compute the number of distinct technology classes appearing among the patents examined 
by a particular examiner.  Using six broad technology classes, this measure (EXAMINER TECH. 
EXPERIENCE) is displayed in Figure 2.  We see that it is most common to have examined 
patents in nearly all of the six classes.  Yet even if an examiner has dealt with all types of patents, 
he may still be highly specialized within a single technology category with only an occasional 
patent elsewhere.  A more sophisticated approach to deal with this issue is to compute a 
Herfindahl type index of the dispersion of an examiner’s patents over technology classes.
15  This 
measure (EXAMINER SPECIALIZATION) is plotted in Figure 3.  While some noise is inherent 
in this measure due to the nature of the technology classification system, its mean level across 
examiners (0.75) indicates a high average degree of specialization.  As Figure 3 indicates, 
however, there is also considerable variation: while the modal examiner is highly specialized, 
with a specialization index near 1, there are still a significant number with a much greater degree 
of dispersion of patents across technology classes. 
Perhaps more interestingly, there is also substantial variation among examiners in the 
characteristics of “their” patents.  Figure 4 shows the distribution of the average number of 
citations received overall all patents issued by each examiner (EXAMINER CITES PER 
                                                 
14 This may be somewhat biased upward since patent examiners may not “exit” in the current way we have computed 
this particular statistic 
15 A Herfindahl index is a commonly used measure of concentration, based the sum of the squares of the share of a  20
PATENT).  The distribution is highly skewed.  The coefficient of variation associated with 
examiner cites received per patent issued is over 0.5; and over 10% of examiners have citation 
rates more than double the average citation rate.  Similarly, as shown in Figure 5, while the 
average self-citation rate (SELF-CITE) is relatively low, particularly given the technological 
specialization of examiners, some examiners have self-citation rates more than three times the 
sample mean.  Another method for understanding the importance of heterogeneity across 
examiners is to use ANOVA analysis to formally test for the presence of examiner effects in 
several key statistics associated with the examination process.  An advantage of this statistical 
approach is that we can condition on other variables that might explain the observed differences 
across examiners, such as the technological areas of the patents they examine.  Recall that in H1, 
H2, and H3 we hypothesized that the differences across examiners were not simply a reflection 
of the technological area of the patents they examined. 
In Table 3A, we present a simple ANOVA analysis based on our complete sample of 
298,441 patents attributed to the 196 CAFC-tested examiners.  The results indicate that 
examiners matter: a significant share of the variance in this sample in the four variables capturing 
the volume and pattern of citations by and to a particular patent (CITATIONS MADE, 
CITATIONS RECEIVED, ORIGINALITY, and GENERALITY) is accounted for by fixed 
examiner effects, with a particularly strong effect in the ANOVA of CITATIONS RECEIVED.  
A similar result is obtained for the length of time between application and grant: about 8% of the 
variance in this measure can be attributed to differences among examiners.  A much smaller 
share of variance is explained for the number of claims on each patent.  These results are robust 
to controlling for differences across technology classes.  As Table 3B shows, there are visible 
differences across technology classes in the fraction of variance explained by examiner effects.  
There appears to be much more homogeneity across examiners in examination of Mechanical 
patents, with significantly less homogeneity in CITATIONS MADE for Chemical patents, and in 
the approval time for Electrical/Electronic patents.  Overall, these results confirm the intuition 
we developed in our qualitative investigation:  there is substantial heterogeneity across 
examiners, even after controlling for the important technology and cohort effects. 
                                                                                                                                                             
variable across categories.  21
The analysis above suggests that examiners vary, particularly in terms of the rate at which 
their patents tend to receive citations. But how does this variation, which we have suggested as a 
proxy for examiner generosity, affect our set of CAFC-tested patents?  Table 4 presents 
regressions relating the CITATIONS RECEIVED by the CAFC-tested patents to a set of 
examiner characteristics, and in particular EXAMINER CITES PER PATENT.  One result is 
particularly striking: there is a very strong relationship between EXAMINER CITES PER 
PATENT and CITATIONS RECEIVED by CAFC-tested patents.  The effect is slightly reduced, 
but still quite significant, after conditioning on the patent’s detailed technology sub-class, cohort, 
and assignee type.  In each of the specifications in Table 4, increasing EXAMINER CITES PER 
PATENT by one patent (less than one-third of a standard deviation) increases the predicted 
number of citations of the CAFC-tested patent by more than one (recall that CAFC-tested patents 
have much higher overall citation rates).  Other observable examiner characteristics have a less 
clear relationship with CITATIONS RECEIVED.  The overall level of self-citation, experience 
(both in terms of years as well as the total level of issued patents) and a measure of near-term 
workflow (3-MONTH VOLUME) are all insignificant in their impact on CITATIONS 
RECEIVED. 
Many factors may affect how many citations a patent receives. Citations received are 
frequently thought to reflect the technological significance of the claimed invention.  Pioneering 
inventions with broad claims and no closely related prior art will tend to tend to be frequently 
cited as follow-on inventors improve on the original invention.  Citations may also reflect the 
quality or scope of the disclosure accompanying the claims.  We cannot directly measure either 
of these factors here, and our analysis assumes that they are randomly distributed across the 
patents in our sample.  Nonetheless these results do indicate that a significant fraction of the 
variation in citations received by any particular patent is driven by a single aspect of examiner 
heterogeneity, the average propensity of “their” patents to attract citations.  This is true even after 
controlling for other important attributes of the patent such as the technology class, the year when 
it was approved, and the type of assignee. 
 
The Impact of Examiner and Patent Characteristics on Litigation Outcomes 
  22
We now turn to the final part of our analysis — linking examiner characteristics to 
litigation outcomes.  While the overall probability of validity being upheld is approximately 
50%, there is substantial variation in this across technological areas, year of patent approval, and 
even the type of assignee (see Figures 6-8).  For example, while pharmaceutical and medical 
patents are more likely than not to be upheld, a substantial majority of computers & 
communications equipment patents are overturned.  As well, the age of a patent seems to be an 
important predictor of validity — pre-1990 approvals are much more likely to be upheld by the 
CAFC than post-1990 approvals.  As we emphasized in Section II, these findings suggest the 
importance of controlling for detailed technology classes and cohorts in our analysis as we seek 
to evaluate the sensitivity of validity findings to examiner characteristics. 
We begin our analysis in Tables 5 and 6, which compare the means of examiner 
characteristics and patent characteristics, conditional on whether the CAFC ruled the patent 
valid.  Several issues stand out. First, the conditional means associated with most of the patent 
characteristics are roughly the same. It is useful to note that there is less than a 10% difference in 
the level of CITATIONS RECEIVED between the two groups.  The only striking difference is in 
APPROVAL TIME, where the time taken to approve invalid patents is significantly higher than 
the time taken to approve those that were found to be valid.  This is interesting, though certainly 
not dispositive, evidence against a simple tradeoff between approval times and patent quality as 
measured by validity rulings.  Turning to the mean examiner characteristics by validity (Table 6), 
the striking differences are in terms of EXAMINER CITES PER PATENT and 3-MONTH 
VOLUME.  There is no significant difference in the means according to experience level; if 
anything, invalid patents are associated with examiners with higher mean levels of experience, 
both in terms of volume and tenure.  This stands in useful contrast to the most naïve 
interpretation of H4, which predicts that EXPERIENCE should be positively correlated with 
VALIDITY.  In contrast, consistent with the suggestion in H5, invalid patents do seem to be 
associated with examiners with a higher average citation rate.   
Of course, these conditional means ignore the important differences across technologies 
(Figure 6), cohorts (Figure 7), or assignees (Figure 8) and the potential for correlation among the 
examiner characteristics themselves.  We therefore turn to more systematic set of regression  23
analyses in Table 7.  The dependent variable in the regressions takes the value 1 if the CAFC-
tested patent is ruled valid, 0 otherwise.
16 The first two columns of Table 7 provide a test for H4, 
the sensitivity of the probability of a validity finding to the experience of the examiner.  Whether 
detailed controls are included or not, there is no significant relationship between any measure of 
experience and the probability of a ruling of validity.  Indeed, we have experimented with a wide 
variety of specifications relating to these experience measures and there is no systematic 
relationship with validity and these measures in these data.  In the last two columns of Table 7, 
we turn to H5, the sensitivity of a validity ruling to other examiner characteristics.  The only 
significant relationship is with EXAMINER CITES PER PATENT, which has a significant and 
large negative coefficient.  Moreover, this coefficient increases in absolute value when detailed 
technology and cohort controls are included.  According to (7-4), increasing the EXAMINER 
CITES PER PATENT by one standard deviation (3.49), the probability of validity is predicted to 
decline by over 14 percentage points, from a mean of 48%.  In other words, the probability of 
validity is strongly associated with the average rate at which that examiner’s patents have 
received citations.  One way to interpret this result is that the rulings of the CAFC serve to 
mitigate the value of patents allowed by particularly “generous” examiners. 
This finding motivates our final set of regressions using the more nuanced instrumental 
variables procedure in Table 8.  As discussed in Section III, we investigate the mechanism by 
which EXAMINER CITES PER PATENT might affect patent validity rulings by restricting its 
impact to the citation rate of the litigated patent.  In other words, we impose the exclusion 
restriction that, but for its impact on CITATIONS RECEIVED, EXAMINER CITES PER 
PATENT is exogenous to the validity decision.  The results of this IV analysis are striking.  On 
the one hand, the OLS relationship between validity and CITATIONS RECEIVED is 
insignificant (8-1).  However, the coefficient on CITATIONS RECEIVED in the instrumental 
variables equations is significant, large and negative.   Though validity is unrelated to the total 
number of citations received by a patent, validity is strongly related to the portion of the citation 
rate explained by the examiner’s average propensity to grant patents that attract citations. 
                                                 
16 Both Tables 7 and 8 employ a linear probability model, either OLS or IV.  The coefficients are therefore easily 
interpretable, comparable with each other, and we avoid the technical subtleties associated with implementing an 
instrumental variables probit in the context of a small sample.  We experimented with a probit model for the  24
Moreover, the size of this coefficient increases substantially after the inclusion of technology, 
cohort, and assignee effects, as well as with the inclusion of other characteristics of CAFC-tested 
patents.  If our results were being driven by unobserved variation across examiners in the types of 
technologies examined, these controls would likely condition out some of this heterogeneity; the 
fact that our results become stronger after the inclusion of controls makes our findings even more 
suggestive.  In other words, even relying on a test that only allows examiner effects to matter 
only through their impact on the citation rate of the litigated patent, and controlling for 
differences in the timing and type of litigated technology, find that courts invalidate patent rights 
associated with “generous” examiners. 
 
VI.  Discussion & Conclusions 
We have conducted an empirical investigation, both qualitative and quantitative, of the 
role that patent examiners play in the allocation of patent rights.  In addition to interviewing 
administrators and patent examiners at the USPTO, we have constructed and analyzed a novel 
dataset on patent examiners and patent litigation outcomes.  Starting with a sample of patents for 
which the CAFC decided on validity between 1997-2000, we collect historical data on who 
examined these patents at the USPTO.  For each of these examiners, we also collected data on all 
of the other patents that they examined during their career, allowing us to compute a number of 
interesting examiner characteristics.  The dataset obtained by matching these two sources is, of 
course, based on a highly selected sample, since very few patents make it to the CAFC.  
Nonetheless, we view it as a very useful laboratory for us to explore a number of hypotheses 
about the connection between the patent examination and process and the issuance of patent 
rights. Our results are preliminary, but they suggest a number of interesting findings.   
First, patent examiners and the patent examination process are not homogeneous.  There 
is substantial variation in observable characteristics of patent examiners, such as their tenure at 
the USPTO, the number of patents they have examined, the average approval time per issued 
patent, and the degree of specialization in technology areas.  There is also systematic variation in 
outcomes of the examination process — such as the volume and pattern of citations made and 
                                                                                                                                                             
reduced-form OLS results, and the results remain quantitatively and statistically significant.  25
received by patents — that can be attributed to idiosyncratic differences among examiners.  Most 
interestingly, examiners differ in the in the number of citations made to “their” issued patents, 
even after controlling for technology class, issuing cohort, and other factors. 
Second, we find no evidence to date favoring “naïve” hypotheses about examiner 
characteristics and patent quality.  In particular, we find no strong statistical association between 
examiner experience or workload at the time a patent is issued and the probability of the CAFC 
finding it to be invalid if it is subsequently litigated.  Thus, our work does not lead us to a policy 
prescription related to, for example, reducing the turnover of patent examiners. 
Third, “examiners matter:”  though highly structured, and carefully monitored by 
USPTO, patent examination is not a mechanical process.  Examiners necessarily exercise 
discretion, and occasionally this discretion results in patent claims being allowed which are 
overturned by subsequent judicial review.  Our core finding is that the examiners whose patents 
are cited most are also more likely to have their patents ruled invalid by the CAFC.  Our 
econometric procedure distinguishes between citations received by a particular patent due to the 
scope of its claims, or the significance of its particular technology, and citations received due to 
the examiner’s “generosity” as captured by their propensity to allow patents that attract citations. 
 It is only the second of these that has a statistical relationship with CAFC validity rulings. 
The fact that patent examination cannot be mechanistic, and that idiosyncratic aspects of 
examiner behavior appear to have a significant impact on the nature of the patent rights that they 
grant, suggests a significant role for the organization, leadership, and management of USPTO.  
The management literature recognizes the value of corporate culture in the form of informal 
rules, common values, exemplars of behavior, etc. in providing guidance on how to exercise 
discretion.  While idiosyncratic behavior of examiners can be controlled to some extent by 
formal processes such as supervision, selection of examiners, training, incentives etc., the 
institution’s cultural norms necessarily play an important role in their exercise of discretion in 
awarding patent rights.  Policy changes which impact the organizational structure and internal 
culture of the USPTO should be careful to take this into account.  Efforts to improve visible 
aspects of the examination process, such as approval times, have the potential to create long 
lasting and quite subtle changes on less easily measured aspects of the examination process.  26
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TABLE 1 
VARIABLES & DEFINITIONS 
VARIABLE  DEFINITION 
VALIDITY  
VALID  Valid = 1 if patent validity upheld by CAFC; 0 else 
CAFC PATENT CHARACTERISTICS 
CITATIONS RECIEVED  # of Citations to CAFC Patent from grant date through 6 / 2001 
CLAIMS  # of Distinct Claims for CAFC Patent 
APPROVAL TIME  Patent Issue Date – Patent Application Date (Days) 











 ∑ j = technology classes 









 ∑ j = technology classes 
PRIMARY EXAMINER CHARACTERISTICS 
EXPERIENCE (NO. OF 
PATENTS) 
Cumulative Patent Production by Examiner, both primary & 
secondary (see Figure 1A) 
EXAMINER CITATIONS  Cumulative Citations to Examiner Patents (through July, 2001) 
EXAMINER CITES PER 
PATENT 
EXAM CITATIONS divided by EXPERIENCE (NO. OF 
PATENTS), (see Figure 1B) 
SECONDARY EXPERIENCE  Cumulative Patent Production as Secondary Examiner 
SELF-CITE  Share of All Citations to Own Prior Patents (see Figure 1C) 
EXAMINER TECH. 
EXPERIENCE 
Number of broad technology classes of patents on which the 
examiner has experience  
EXAMINER 
SPECIALIZATION 
Herfindahl-type measure of distribution of examiner’s patents 
across broad technology classes 
EXPERIENCE (YEARS)  Cumulative Years Observed as Issuing Examiner (both primary & 
secondary) 
3-MONTH VOLUME  Count of Issued Patents in Three Months Immediately Prior to 
Issue Date 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
TECH CLASS FIXED 
EFFECTS 
6 Distinct Technology Categories Based on Patent Classes (see 
Figure 5A) 
TECHNOLOGY SUB-CLASS 
 FIXED EFFECTS 
35 Distinct Technology Sub-Classes Based on Patent Sub-Classes 
(see Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg) 
COHORT FIXED FFECTS  20 Individual Year Dummies Based on CAFC Patent Issue Date 
ASSIGNEE FIXED EFFECTS  4 Dummies for Type of Assignee (see, Figure 5C)  28
TABLE 2A 
MEANS & STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
 
 MEAN  STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
VALIDITY 
VALID   0.48 0.50
CAFC PATENT CHARACTERISTICS 
CITATIONS RECEIVED  16.74 21.47
CLAIMS  20.52 26.05
APPROVAL TIME  804.60 799.80
GENERALITY  0.41 0.27
ORIGINALITY  0.39 0.28
  
EXAMINER CHARACTERISTICS 
EXPERIENCE (NO. PATENTS)  2180.38 1395.65
EXAMINER CITATIONS  14201.68 12673.34
EXAMINER CITES PER PATENT  6.32 3.49
SECONDARY EXPERIENCE  207.05 137.67
SELF-CITE  0.10 0.06
EXAMINER SPECIALIZATION  0.75 0.20
EXPERIENCE (YEARS)  18.67 5.67







CAFC SAMPLE COMPARED TO “UNIVERSE” 
 
 CAFC  SAMPLE 
(182) 
TYPICAL PATENT 
(1980s application yr) 
CLAIMS 20.5  9-14 
CITATIONS RECEIVED  14.0  6-8 
CITATIONS MADE  16.7  6-8 
ORIGINALITY 0.36  0.3-0.4 
GENERALITY 0.41  0.3-0.4 








196 Examiner Effects 
36 Technology Sub-Class Effects 
24 Cohort Effects 
 
Variable  Fraction of variance 
explained by 
examiner effects 
F-statistic for no 
examiner effect 
F-statistic for no examiner 
effect, controlling for 
detailed technology class 
and cohort 
CITATIONS MADE   0.077  121.71  52.64 
CITATIONS RECEIVED  0.117  193.40  51.07 
APPROVAL TIME  0.083  131.77  78.92 
CLAIMS 0.030  44.83  16.06 
GENERALITY 0.079  105.56  38.97 






ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF 
PATENT CHARACTERISTICS 
BY TECHNOLOGY CLASS 
 
  Fraction of Variance Explained by Examiner Effects 
Variable Chemical  ICT  Drug/Med  Electronic  Mechanical  Other 
CITATIONS MADE  0.123  0.054  0.104  0.078  0.054  0.059 
CITATIONS RECEIVED  0.058  0.099  0.110  0.066  0.076  0.072 
APPROVAL TIME  0.098  0.083  0.074  0.116  0.053  0.053 
CLAIMS 0.033  0.027  0.028  0.022  0.031  0.037 
GENERALITY 0.084  0.112  0.078  0.086  0.055  0.081 




































GENERALITY      11.28
(6.70)





SIG.  SIG.  SIG.
TECHNOLOGY SUB-
CLASS FIXED EFFECTS
SIG.  SIG.  SIG.
ASSIGNEE FIXED 
EFFECTS 
INSIG. INSIG.  INSIG.
    
Regression Statistics 
Adj. R-squared  0.19 0.44  0.45  0.45





MEANS CONDITIONAL ON CAFC VALIDITY RULING 
 
 
 INVALID  VALID 




ORIGINALITY 0.36  0.41 
GENERALITY 0.41  0.41 






MEANS CONDITIONAL ON CAFC VALIDITY RULING 
 
 








CITES PER PATENT 
6.89 5.72 
SELF-CITE 0.10 0.10 




REDUCED-FORM OLS VALIDITY EQUATION 
 










































Insig.  Insig. 
TECHNOLOGY SUB-
CLASS FIXED EFFECTS 
SIG.   SIG. 
ASSIGNEE FIXED 
EFFECTS 
Insig.  Insig. 
    
Regression Statistics 
Adj. R-squared  0.000 0.113 0.017  0.143 






























CLAIMS    0.003
(0.002)
ORIGINALITY    0.238
(0.227)
GENERALITY    0.188
(0.268)





  SIG.  SIG.
TECHNOLOGY SUB-
CLASS FIXED EFFECTS 
  SIG.  SIG.
ASSIGNEE FIXED 
EFFECTS 
   Insig.  Insig.
    
Regression Statistics 
Adj. R-squared  0.000  NA NA  NA
# of Observations  182.00  182.00 170.00  170.00
* IV:   ENDOGENOUS = CITATIONS RECEIVED 
            INST VARS = EXAMINER CITES PER PATENT 
 
 





























number of patents examined































































herfindahl index of technological specialization



































citations received per patent examined


































self citations (fraction of citations made)





























 valid  invalid




























 valid  invalid


















1=unassigned, 2=US_corporate, 3=foreign_corp, 4=US_individual
0
56
 valid  invalid
1 2 3 4